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A RE-EVALUATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE
REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING ON THE
OPEN SECURITIES MARKET
Insider trading occurs when fiduciaries purchase or sell shares of
their corporation and the transactions are, at least in part, motivated by
insider information acquired in performance of their fiduciary duties.'
Although authority exists to the contrary,2 the widely accepted view is
that insider trading should be deterred because it is unfair to other in-
vestors who do not enjoy access to inside information.' A principal
goal of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 is "to insure the mainte-
nance of a fair and honest market" in securities trading.5 One means of
achieving this end is through regulation of insider trading.6
This Note focuses on trading on the open market by corporate of-
ficers and directors who use undisclosed material inside information.
Specifically, this Note examines the lack of federal or state regulation
of insider activity in impersonal market transactions. The present
scheme of insider trading regulation demands renewed examination in
light of recent developments in federal securities law.7
1. W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 2-3 (1968).
2. One commentator, Professor Henry Manne, opposes sanctions against insider trading.
Professor Manne argues that insider trading is a desirable method of rewarding entrepreneurial
effort. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Ferber, The Case Against
Insider Trading.- .4 Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); Manne, In Defense
ofInsider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (1966); Manne, .4 Rejoinder to Mr. Ferber, 23 vAND.
L. REV. 627 (1970); Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 54 (1970).
3. Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir. 1978). See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1037-38
(1961); W. PAINTER, supra note 1, at 1-6; Farmer, Cary, Fleischer & Halleran, Insider Trading in
Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
5. Id at § 78b.
6. The preamble of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 specifically refers to the need to
regulate and control transactions of "officers, directors, and principal security holders." Id "[O]ne
of the primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... was to outlaw the use of
inside information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial advan-
tage to the detriment of uninformed public security holders.' Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
7. Aaron v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens
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The examination begins with a survey of the common-law approach
to insider trading. Part II reviews an innovative remedy fashioned by
the New York Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno.8 Part III
analyzes the effectiveness of federal securities regulation in addition to
emphasizing recent Supreme Court mandates in rule lob-5 actions.9
Part IV evaluates three reform proposals for providing legal sanctions
against insider trading on the open securities market.
I. COMMON-LAW APPROACHES TO INSIDER TRADING
Traditionally directors and officers of a corporation owe no duty to
disclose material inside information in the purchase or sale of stock.' 0
If the insider makes misrepresentations or half-truths in the purchase
or sale of stock, however, he may be liable in a common-law tort action
for deceit or fraud.1' Thus, under the majority common-law approach,
a director or officer is not liable to a purchaser or seller for nondisclo-
sure of inside information providing the nondisclosure falls short of an
affirmative misrepresentation or half-truth.' 2
Several jurisdictions developed the "special facts rule" as an excep-
tion to the majority rule.' 3 The rule, first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Strong v. Repide,14 recognizes a duty to disclose inside infor-
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
10. "The orthodox view was that a director or officer occupied a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation and its shareholders as a body with respect to corporate business and property." H.
HENN, CORPORATIONS § 239, at 471 (2d ed. 1970). Because shares are the private property of the
shareholders, not the corporation, dealings in shares were not considered corporate transactions,
Therefore directors and officers owed no fiduciary duties to the shareholders concerning such
dealings. Id See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933); Comment, Insider
Trading Without Disclosure-YTheory of Liability, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 472 (1967); Comment, Insider
Liabilities Examined, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 808 (1967).
11. R. FROME & V. ROSENZWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS § 8.101, at
233-34 (1975). The elements of a common-law action for deceit are as follows: "There must be (1)
a false representation of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) the defendant must know of the falsity (scien-
ter) but make the statement nevertheless for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely on it; and
(5) the plaintiff must justifiably rely on it and (6) suffer damages as a consequence." L. Loss,
supra note 3, at 1431.
12. R. FROME, supra note 11, § 8.101, at 234; H. HENN, supra note 10, § 239, at 471.
13. R. FROME, supra note 11, § 8.102, at 234-35; H. HENN, supra note 10, § 239, at 472; L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 1446-47.
14. 213 U.S. 419 (1909). A controlling stockholder and general manager of a corporation was
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mation to sellers or purchasers under special facts or circumstances.' 5
Although the special facts rule marked a significant departure from
the majority approach, a third view, the "minority rule," completely
repudiated the traditional majority view. The minority rule requires
corporate fiduciaries to disclose all material information to trading
shareholders.' 6  Under this approach nondisclosure, even in the ab-
sence of special facts, constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty.' 7
Organization of the common-law approach into three distinct views
is easier in theory than in practice. Courts purporting to apply the ma-
jority rule instead apply the special facts doctrine.' 8 In many states the
expanding special facts doctrine virtually encompasses the minority
rule."' Frequently, minority rule cases actually contain an element of
fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty." The case law does reveal, how-
ever, a growing sense of fiduciary responsibility to disclose inside infor-
mation.2'
Although courts are expanding the fiduciary duties of a corporate
insider, common-law approaches have been unsatisfactory in deterring
found guilty of fraud in purchasing the holdings of a minority stockholder without disclosing
information concerning negotiations for the sale of the company's business at a very favorable
price. On consideration of all the factors, particularly the insider's position and knowledge of the
company, the Court held that "it became the duty of the defendant, acting in good faith, to state
the facts before making the purchase." Id at 431.
15. The special facts or circumstances that trigger a duty either to disclose material inside
information to sellers or purchasers or to refrain from buying or selling stock include: Closely
held shares with no readily ascertainable market value, Saville v. Sweet, 234 A.D. 236, 254 N.Y.S.
768 (1932); director or officer with insider access to information, Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1951); shareholder lacking in business acumen, Jaynes v. Jaynes, 98 Cal. App. 2d 447, 220
P.2d 598 (1951); instigation of a transaction by director or officer, Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419
( 1909); and the use of an intermediary by a director or officer coupled with nondisclosure of the
principal, Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945). See Comment, Insider
Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. CHI. L.
REv. 121, 123-25 (1962).
16. Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Jacquith v. Mason,
99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916).
17. Most commentators approve this view. L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1446-47. See Annot., 84
A.L.R. 615, 622-23 (1933).
18. See, e.g., Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945).
19. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362,45 S.E. 232 (1903); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498,
77 P. 277 (1904).
21. In the last fifty years the majority rule has been applied in pure form in very few cases.
H. HENN, supra note 10, § 239, at 472 n.4. Some authorities maintain that the "majority rule" has
actually been applied in pure form in only one or two cases in the last thirty years. L. Loss, supra
note 3, at 1448 n.8.
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insider trading on the securities exchange or in over-the-counter trans-
actions. Even under the liberal special facts or minority rule, the suc-
cessful plaintiff must demonstrate privity between the parties. 2 The
burden of proving that a plaintiff bought the shares from, or sold them
to, the insider presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to plaintiff
when the transaction occurs on a national securities exchange. 23 Fur-
thermore, plaintiff must demonstrate reliance on the disclosed or, worse
yet, the undisclosed information.2 4 Reliance, however, is virtually im-
possible to prove in anonymous trading transactions.2 5 At common
law an insider, even one with a duty to disclose inside information, can
trade on the open market with impunity.26
II. AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO INSIDER TRADING:
DIAMOND V. OREAMUNO
A. Prelude to Diamond
At common law, courts do not permit the corporation to recover
against its officers or directors who trade on inside information.27 The
only two recognized exceptions to corporate nonrecovery occur with
diversion of a corporate opportunity,28 or loss of corporate con-
22. See note 11 supra for a list of the elements of an action for deceit.
23. For a good discussion of the time consuming and expensive steps necessary in tracing
shares from the purchasers to the original sellers in open market transactions, see Reynolds v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 569-70 (D. Utah 1970). See also SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 355-56 (1963).
24. See note II supra. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1951); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
26. Every state has some law regulating securities transactions. These statutes, known as
"blue sky laws," typically protect only purchasers and are directed at deterring infirmities in the
original issuance of securities, not in subsequent transactions in the stock. See L. Loss & E.
CoWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 11 (1958). "Even the Uniform [Securities] Act, now in force in nearly
half the states, falls short. It has adopted all three lob-5 clauses in its general prohibition and
clause 2 in its express civil liability provision, but recovery is limited to purchasers, and implied
liability is denied." 1 A. BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 2.7(2), at 57 (1977).
27. See notes 10-25 supra and accompanying text.
28. The corporate opportunity doctrine prohibits corporate personnel from diverting to
themselves opportunities in which the corporation has a right, property interest, or expectancy or
which, in justice, belongs to the corporation. The following factors often point to a corporate
opportunity: (1) The corporation has a present interest, a tangible expectancy in the opportunity;
(2) the opportunity was discovered by the director in his capacity as director of the corporation; (3)
the corporation's funds were involved in the director discovering or acquiring the opportunity; or
(4) where the corporation's facilities or employees were used in developing it. H. HENN, supra
[Vol. 58:915
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trol. 29 Courts that deny relief to the corporation for use of inside infor-
mation by its officers and directors reason that the corporation suffers
no harm in the traditional sense of measurable, monetary loss. The
resulting injury, if any, is to the uninformed trader, rather than to the
corporation.3
In Brophy v. Cities Service3' a court first recognized a cause of action
in the corporation for recovery of insider trading profits. The Brophy
court held an employee liable to the corporation for profits realized in
the purchase and sale of stock based on inside information.32 The em-
ployee, a confidential secretary to an officer and director of Cities Serv-
ice, learned through his position that the corporation planned a tender
offer for a substantial number of shares.3 3 The proposed offer was suf-
ficient to cause a rise in the market price of the shares. 34 Acting on the
basis of the inside information, the employee purchased a block of
stock and subsequently sold the stock when the corporation entered the
market in accordance with the planned tender offer.35
In ordering an accounting of the profits, the Delaware court stated
that loss to the corporation need not be alleged in a suit in equity for
breach of a confidential relationship by an employee. 36 The court anal-
note 10, § 237, at 462. See Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939); Irving Trust Co. v.
Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934); Steven v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620
(1946).
29. See, e.g., Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern
Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See generally H. HENN, supra note 10, at § 241; Hill,
The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 986 (1957); Jennings, Trading in Corporate
Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1956).
30. In Newman v. Baldwin, 13 Misc. 2d 898, 179 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1958), the sharehold-
ers of the corporation brought a derivative suit against the directors of the company for profits
obtained through misrepresentations made in the sale of stock. The court held:
[D]efendants have not been paid anything for an asset of the corporation. They have
made profits as a result of misrepresentations, not an asset of the corporation [sic]. No
court of equity would hold the corporation is entitled to the fruits of such misrepresenta-
tions. If there were misrepresentations, those who purchased in reliance on them may
have causes of action against the tortfeasors for damages they sustained, but no recovery
can enure to the benefit of the corporation or its stockholders generally. As to them, such
a recovery would be an unjustified windfall.
Id at 900-01, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 22. See generally Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders
Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53, 64-65 (1960).
31. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
32. Id at 247, 70 A.2d at 8.
33. Id at 243, 70 A.2d at 7.
34. Id
35. Id
36. The Brophy court stated: "Public policy will not permit an employee occupying a posi-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ogized an employee occupying a position of trust and confidence to the
corporation to a fiduciary owing a duty to the beneficiary. The court
held that the employee, as a fiduciary, must not use confidential infor-
mation acquired in the course of employment for his own benefit. 38
B. Diamond v. Oreamuno
The principle set forth in Brophy lay dormant for twenty years until
the New York Court of Appeals handed down the Diamond v.
Oreamuno decision.39 In Diamond defendants Oreamuno and Gonza-
les were, respectively, chairman of the board of directors and president
of Management Assistance, Inc. (MAI).40 Defendants learned that the
net earnings of the corporation dropped seventy-five percent between
July 1966 and August 1966 because of increased corporate expendi-
tures.4 ' Before the corporation publicly announced the decrease in net
earnings, defendants sold 56,500 shares of MAI stock at the prevailing
market price of twenty-eight dollars per share.42 After the corporation
disclosed its net earnings, the value of the stock fell to eleven dollars
per share.43
Plaintiff, a shareholder of MAI, brought a derivative suit to compel
an accounting of the profits acquired by defendants. 44 The New York
Court of Appeals held that insider trading constitutes a breach of the
fiduciary duties owed to the corporation regardless of whether the cor-
tion of trust and confidence toward his employer to abuse that relation to his own profit, regard-
less of whether his employer suffers a loss." Id at 246, 70 A.2d at 8.
37. Id at 244, 70 A.2d at 7-8.
38. Id
39. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
40. MAI was in the business of financing computer installations through sale and lease back
arrangements with various commercial and industrial users. Id at 496, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 79-80.
41. Under the lease provisions, MAI was required to maintain and repair the computers.
Because MAI lacked the capacity to perform this function it was forced to hire the manufacturer
of the computers, International Business Machines (IBM), to service the machines. As a result of
a sharp increase in service charges by IBM, MAI's expenses for August 1966 rose considerably
and its net earnings declined approximately 75%. Id at 496-97, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 80.
42. Id at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
43. The plaintiff alleged that "by taking advantage of their privileged position and their ac-
cess to confidential information, Oreamuno and Gonzales were able to realize $800,000 more for
their securities than they would have had this inside information not been available to them." Id
44. I1d at 496, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
[Vol. 58:915
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poration is a party to the transaction.45
Relying on principles from the law of trusts, the court reasoned that
one who learns of confidential information by virtue of his fiduciary
relationship cannot use that information for personal benefit.46 The
court compared the corporate fiduciary to a trustee, labeled "insider
information" a corporate asset, and concluded that a corporate officer
or director could not appropriate that asset for personal benefit.47 Al-
though the Diamond court found that plaintiff need not allege injury to
the corporation in an action founded on breach of fiduciary duty, the
court reasoned that it could infer harm in loss of corporate prestige and
good will from abuse of a fiduciary relationship.4"
The court concluded that the available federal remedies were inade-
quate to deter insider trading in this situation.49 Section 10(b),50 the
general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act, provides three different
means of enforcement, but the court found those remedies limited in
scope." A Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) injunctive pro-
ceeding, the first method of enforcement, was more effective in estab-
lishing a principle than in providing a regular method of
enforcement. 2 The class action, a second method of enforcement and
a potentially effective remedy, was laden with unresolved questions. 3
A third method of enforcement under section 10(b), a private right of
action, only existed if the individual purchaser or seller could demon-
45. Id at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
46. Id at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
47. Just as a trustee has no right to retain for himself the profits yielded by property
placed in his possession but must account to his beneficiaries, a corporate fiduciary, who
is entrusted with potentially valuable information, may not appropriate that asset for his
own use, even though, in so doing, he causes no injury to the corporation.
Id at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. This denomination of inside information as a
corporate asset was extensively criticized by the court in Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 193-94
(7th Cir. 1978). See note 70 infra. See also the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY:
An agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his employment...
has a duty not to use it to the disadvantage of the principal .... He also has a duty to
account for any profits made by the use of such information, although this does not harm
the principal.. . . So, if he has "inside" information... profits made by him in stock
transactions undertaken because of his knowledge are held in constructive trust for the
principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388, Comment c (1957).
48. 24 N.Y.2d at 498-99, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
49. Id at 502-03, 248 N.E.2d at 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
51. See notes 87-89 infra and accompanying text.
52. 24 N.Y.2d at 502-03, 248 N.E.2d at 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
53. Id
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strate injury resulting from the insider trading. 4 The court could not
refer to a single successful prosecution for insider trading in a public
sale of securities.5 Unless a section 16(b) "short swing profit" viola-
tion 56 was present, the court determined that an effective federal rem-
edy did not exist. 7 The defendants fell outside the proscriptions of
section 16(b), however, because defendants' purchases and sales were
not within a six month period."
In supporting the derivative action as a proper remedy, the Diamond
court relied heavily on Brophy v. Cities Service59 and section 16(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.60 Section 16(b) provides for
corporate recovery of certain insider trading profits acquired in the
purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) of securities within a six
month period.61 Section 16(b), the court reasoned, illustrates that the
derivative action can be an effective method for dealing with insider
trading and can be used to accomplish a similar purpose in situations
not covered by the statute.62 The New York court found nothing in
federal law that limited the power of the states to fashion additional
remedies.63
C. Aftermath of Diamond v. Oreamuno
The innovative approach fashioned by the Diamond court, although
a significant development in state common law, met with judicial hos-
54. Id
55. Id
56. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
57. 24 N.Y.2d at 502-03, 248 N.E.2d at 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85.
58. Id at 501, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84. See notes 178-90 infra and accompa-
nying text.
59. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949). See 24 N.Y.2d at 500-01, 248 N.E.2d at 913-14, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 83. See notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
61. Id See notes 178-90 infra and accompanying text.
62. 24 N.Y.2d at 500, 248 N.E.2d at 913, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
63. Congress expressly provided against such an implication, the court said, by declaring that
"[t]he rights and remedies provided by this title [§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934]
shall be in addition to any and all rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity." 24
N.Y.2d at 503-04, 248 N.E.2d at 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 85, (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976)).
In fashioning a derivative right in the corporation for insider trading violations, the court was
undeterred by the possibility of double liability. If the defendant wished to protect himself against
double liability, the court suggested that the defendant interplead all possible claimants and bind
them to the judgment. 24 N.Y.2d at 504, 248 N.E.2d at 915-16, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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tility in other state forums.M4 The Florida Supreme Court in Schein v.
Chasen65 not only refused to extend the innovative ruling of Diamond
to trading tippees, but also refused to follow Diamond in holding a di-
rector-officer liable in the absence of a showing of actual damage to the
corporation.66 The Schein court recognized the need to maintain a free
and honest securities market, but restricted consideration of this need
to claims arising under federal securities law.67
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Freeman v. Decio68 dis-
missed a derivative suit against corporate officers and directors to re-
64. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
65. 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
In Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Lehman
Bros. v. Schein. 416 U.S. 386, on certiflcation, to the Fla. Sup. Ct., 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975), the
plaintiffs, stockholders in Lum's, Inc., a Florida corporation, brought a derivative action by invok-
ing diversity jurisdiction. In November 1969 Chasen, president and chief operating officer at
Lum's, announced to a group of securities investors that the corporation's earning prospects for
the fiscal year ending July, 1970 would be approximately one dollar per share. Two months later,
after learning that Lum's earnings would be significantly lower, Chasen telephoned Simon, a
stockholder employed by defendant Lehman Bros., and relayed the revised earnings figure. Si-
mon reconveyed the information to investment advisors of two mutual funds. On the morning of
January 9, 1970, before any public announcement, the two mutual funds sold, in the aggregate,
83,000 shares of Lum's at $17.50 a share. After the public announcement the stock closed at
fourteen dollars per share. Plaintiffs alleged that the investment advisors and the mutual funds
were jointly and severally liable to the corporation under Florida law for misusing corporation
information to their own advantage in violation of the duty they owed to Lum's. Id
66. 313 So.2d at 746-47. In earlier Schein proceedings, however, the Second Circuit Court
had held that Florida law was the applicable state law, but in the absence of a clearly enunciated
state rule, the federal court could turn to other state law for guidance in resolving the issue. Con-
cluding that the Schein issues resembled those present in Diamond, the court interpreted the facts
in light of the New York court's decision. The Second Circuit held that Diamond "should extend
to reach third parties, who, though not officers or directors of the injured corporation, are involved
with directors in a common enterprise to misuse confidential corporate information for their own
enrichment." 478 F.2d at 823. The court reasoned that the corporate image is damaged just as
much by tippee trading as when the trading is by its own directors and oficers. To immunize
tippees from liability to the corporation would encourage insider "leaks" to outsiders, thus defeat-
ing the policies underlying the Diamond decision. Id
The Second Circuit decision was later vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme
Court on certification to the Florida courts to determine Florida law. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386, on cert/ifcation to the Fla. Sup. Ct., 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
The Second Circuit's decision is analyzed in conjunction with Diamond v. Oreamuno in Note,
Common Law Corporation Recoveryfor Trading on Non-Public Information, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
269 (1974). See Note, From Brophy to Diamond to Schein: Muddled Thinking Excellent Result, 1
J. CORP. L. 83 (1975).
67. 313 So.2d at 745 (citing 478 F.2d at 825 (Kaufman, J., dissenting)). The Florida Supreme
Court's reasoning is compared with that of the Second Circuit's at 41 Mo. L. REv. 589 (1976).
68. 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
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cover profits allegedly acquired through use of inside information.69
The Freeman court held that Indiana law neither recognized this cor-
porate right nor was likely to follow the lead of the New York Court of
Appeals in Diamond.0 Although the Freeman court acknowledged the
general policy of deterring insider trading, it found that the expanding
common law and existent federal remedies afforded sufficient relief."
Repeated rejection of the Diamond approach to insider trading regula-
tion dictates a re-evaluation of present federal remedies to determine if
they do indeed "afford sufficient relief' to deter insider trading on the
open securities market.
III. FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
Before adoption of federal securities regulations, no federal remedy
existed for fraudulent activities in the securities area.72 The wake of
confusion and disaster following the stock market crash of 1929, how-
ever, produced a public demand for closer supervision and investiga-
tion of securities exchange practices.73 Congress heard considerable
69. Id Plaintiffs, shareholders of Skyline Corporation, brought a derivative action against
the corporation's directors to recover profits the directors allegedly acquired through use of inside
information. The plaintiffs charged the defendants with creating a market for the corporate stock
by overstating earnings and understating expenses and then selling a substantial number of their
shares on this artificial market. Id at 187.
70. d at 193-96. The Freeman court criticized Diamond for its reliance on Brophy and
distinguished Brophy because potential harm to the corporation existed on the Brophy facts, Be-
cause the corporation was about to enter the market, the employee's acquisition of stock competed
with the corporate plans. The Freeman court viewed this potential harm as a very persuasive
factor in the Brophy court's decision. Id
The Seventh Circuit also objected to Diamond's automatic characterization of inside informa-
tion as a corporate asset. Rather, the court argued, the question is whether there is any potential
loss to the corporation from the use of this information. The court objected strongly to Diamond's
failure to insist on a showing of damages to the corporation. The court accused the Diamond
court of instituting the corporate cause of action as a "back up" plan in the event the "real vic-
tims" were unable to bring suit. 584 F.2d at 193-96.
71. The Freeman court recognized that several courts had expanded significantly the require-
ments of privity, reliance, and misrepresentation in the lOb-5 actions decided subsequent to Dia-
mond. This fact, coupled with the court's clarification of class action requirements, provided an
adequate basis for relief in the opinion of the Freeman court. Id
72. See notes 10-30 supra and accompanying text. The only possibility of federal relief prior
to the enactment of securities regulations was a federal prosecution for violation of the mail fraud
statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). This statute prohibits use of the mail service to perpetrate a
fraud.
73. Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act, profits from "sure thing"
speculation in the stocks of their corporations were more or less generally accepted by
the financial community as part of the emolument for serving as a corporate officer or
director notwithstanding the flagrantly inequitable character of such trading.
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testimony concerning the evils of insider trading.74 In response to pub-
lic outcry and to prevent abuse of fiduciary duties by corporate officers
and directors, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193375 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.76
A. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) is the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.77 The provision grants the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission power to adopt rules and regulations proscribing deceptive
practices in the purchase or sale of securities. 8 Rule lOb-5, promul-
gated by the Commission in 1942, prohibits, inter alia, affirmative mis-
representations and omissions of material facts in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.7 9 Although section 10(b) does not ex-
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1037 (citing 10 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (1944)). See W. PAINTER, supra note
I, at 1-6.
74. Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee
was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations
who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came to them in
such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse
was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by large stockholders who,
while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control over the destinies of their
companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others.
L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1037 (citing STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTicEs, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. Doc. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934)).
75. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976). The purpose of the Securities Act
of 1933, as stated by Congress in the preamble, was "[to provide for full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to
prevent frauds in the sale thereof ...... Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
The Securities Act of 1933 contains several antifraud provisions, but these are limited in scope
and offer a private remedy only to the defrauded purchaser. Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 provides a private remedy when registration statements contain untrue statements or omis-
sions of material facts at the time they became effective. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
Section 17(a) is a general antifraud provision that makes it unlawful to use any facility of inter-
state commerce to defraud purchasers of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
79. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) states:
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pressly provide a private right of action to recover damages, the courts
extended an implied right of recovery to the defrauded investor.80
Regulation of insider trading under rule lob-5 is premised on the
theory that the "market for a security should reflect the judgments of
purchasers and sellers with equal access to all relevant information."8'
Possession of material inside information alone is not prohibited under
rule lOb-5. 82  An insider possessing confidential information violates
rule 1Ob-5 if the insider subsequently trades without disclosing the in-
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Rule lob-5 was created to fill the void present in § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1976). The elements of a violation under § 17(a) include the requirements of misrepresentation
or omission of a material fact that give rise to an action under rule lob-5 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. Section 17(a), however, extends relief only to defrauded purchasers. After
tabling a contemplated extension of§ 17(a) the Commission adopted rule X-10B-5, later renamed
rule lOb-5. See K. BIALKIN, THE 101-5 SERIES OF RULES 4 (1975); L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1426-
27. See also Conference on Codfcation of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922
(1967).
80. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Kardon v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The court in Kardon relied on the RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934), which implies a civil remedy in favor of any person injured by
violation of a statute enacted for the protection of the class of persons of which he is a member. 69
F. Supp. at 513-14. Section 286 reads:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if-
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the
other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect ....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
The rationale underlying a private cause of action is to encourage enforcement of the Act and to
compensate for the SEC's inability to investigate and prosecute every violation. An implied right
of action prevailed in spite of arguments by the rule's originators that no private right was in-
tended and that where a private right was so intended, both the 1933 and 1934 Acts explicitly
provided for one, eg., §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, and § 18 of the 1934 Act. K. BIALKIN, supra
note 79, at 5.
The Supreme Court finally recognized an implied right of action under § 10(b) in Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
81. R. FROME, supra note 11, at 157.
82. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/9
INSIDER TRADING IN SECURITIES
formation.3 The judicially created "disclose or abstain" rule requires
an insider possessing material inside information to disclose the infor-
mation to the investing public or abstain from trading in the securities
while the information remains undisclosed. 84
Rule lOb-5 has existed for almost forty years. Although few would
doubt the rule's broad purpose, few would agree that its purpose has
been adequately effectuated.85 One of the chief criticisms of the rule is
that its proscriptive measures fail to provide relief when insider trading
appears on the open securities market.8 6
Three civil remedies are available against an insider who trades
without disclosing material information: The SEC can sue for injunc-
tive relief against future violations;87 the defrauded investor can bring a
private cause of action for damages, restitution, or recission;88 or de-
frauded investors may bring a class action. 9 Although the remedies
appear sufficient, they fail to provide effective relief in most instances
of insider trading on the open market.
1. Injunctive Relief
The SEC is expressly authorized to bring injunctive actions under
section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.90 As "ancillary
relief' the SEC can request a court order for disgorgement of profits.9
Although disgorgement of profits could be a powerful deterrent to the
insider, time, money, and manpower limitations prevent the SEC from
83. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
84. id at 848.
85. See, e.g., 4 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, § 12.9, at 283.
86. See, e.g., Note, Regulation of Insider Trading on the Open Market: A Re-evaluation of
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 9 GA. L. REV. 189, 200-05 (1974).
87. Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). See, e.g.,
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
88. See note 80 supra.
89. See notes 170-71 infra and accompanying text.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
91. See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). Normally the defendants pay the
profits into a fund for eventual distribution to persons deemed entitled to them. For a discussion
of administrative remedies available to the Securities and Exchange Commission, see Jacobs, Judi-
cial andAdministrative Remedes. Available to the SECfor Breaches of Rule 10b-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 397 (1979).
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adequately pursuing many alleged violations of rule lOb-5.92
Assuming the SEC does have sufficient resources to effectively pur-
sue rule 10b-5 violations, injunctive relief is only granted to prevent
future violations.93 In many situations inside trading is completed and
material information disclosed before the rule lOb-5 violation becomes
apparent. Furthermore, the SEC may prefer to bring an administrative
proceeding against the alleged violator rather than to institute judicial
proceedings.94 If the SEC elects to resolve the issue administratively,
however, it is powerless to require disgorgement of profits.95 Thus, al-
though a SEC action for injunctive relief is a potentially powerful
weapon, the opportunities for successful application are limited.
2. Private Cause of Action
Courts imply a private cause of action under rule lOb-5 96 to aid the
SEC in deterring activities proscribed under rule lOb-5 97 and to com-
pensate the victims of fraud.98 Judicial recognition of the broad reme-
dial99 and preventive'0° purposes of the rule led courts to extend the
scope of rule lOb-5 beyond the confines of common-law deceit. 01 The
92. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
93. Section 21(d) requires a reasonable likelihood that the defendant will commit the .viola-
tions in the future. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
94. See, e.g., Investors Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267
(July 29, 1971).
95. See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW.
947, 954 (1976).
96. See note 80 supra.
97. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5. Judicial Revision o0Legislative In-
tent, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 637 n.53 (1963).
98. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1970); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
99. The Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963), stated: "A fundamental purpose, common to these statutes is to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry."
100. Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability under SEC Rule
10b-5: A Commentary, 38 O,io ST. L.J. 67, 69 (1977) (prevent inequitable practices and insure
fairness in securities transactions).
101. See note II supra for the elements of a common-law deceit action.
"The fact is that the courts have repeatedly said that the fraud provision in the SEC acts ,
are not limited to circumstances which would give rise to a common law action for deceit." L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 1435.
"[C]ommon law fraud provides a starting point from which the courts can develop a federal
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lack of explicit legislative history on the scope of rule lOb-51° 2 coupled
with the noticeable reluctance, until recently, of the Supreme Court to
entertain rule 1Ob-5 actions, °3 yielded major inconsistencies among the
circuits in defining basic elements of a rule lOb-5 action."°
An increasing concern with the flood of securities litigation in the
federal courts0 5 finally prompted Supreme Court action. The Supreme
Court responded to this concern and the need for precise delineation of
the requisite elements of a rule lOb-5 action by sharply curtailing ac-
cess to federal courts through strict interpretation of basic elements of a
lOb-5 action.' 06 In the past decade the Supreme Court delineated four
basic elements of a lOb-5 action. First, rule lOb-5 extends protection
only to the defrauded purchaser or seller of securities. 7 Secondly, the
defrauded purchaser or seller must demonstrate "scienter" on the part
of the defendant. 0 Thirdly, the lOb-5 plaintiff must prove a misrepre-
sentation or an omission of a material fact.' 9 Finally, the injured
party must show resulting damage, usually established in terms of reli-
ance or causation. 110
A noticeable cutback in rule 1 Ob-5 relief occurred when the Supreme
common law that will promote the broad policy goals of rule 1Ob-5." Note, The Nature and Scope
of the Reliance Requirement, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 363, 367 (1973).
102. See Proceedings, Conference on Cod&cation of Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793
(1967) (Milton Freeman, Attorney and Assistant Solicitor, SEC, 1934-46):
It [rule l0b-5] was intended to give the Commission power to deal with this problem-
lack of protection for defrauded sellers of securities. It had no relation in the commis-
sion's contemplation to private proceedings. How it got into private proceedings was by
the ingenuity of the private Bar starting with the Kardon case.
Id at 922.
103. Although the Commission promulgated rule lOb-5 in 1942, the first rule lOb-5 case did
not reach the Supreme Court until 1969. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
104. See generally Note, supra note 101.
105. See Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 158 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 960 (1974); Friendly, Federal.Apellate Justice: Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974).
106. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
107. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
108. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
109. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 456 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
110. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Court affirmed the Birnbaum".. purchaser-seller requirement. In 1952
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals" t2 in Birnbaum v. Newport Seel
Corp. 113 held that rule lOb-5 extended protection only to a defrauded
purchaser or seller of securities."I4 Dissatisfied with the arbitrariness of
the rule, however, lower courts chipped away at the Birnbaum doc-
trine. 15 The courts liberally interpreted the purchaser-seller require-
ment to include those defrauded investors not technically connected
with the sale of securities.I 6 Finally in 1975 the Supreme Court in Blue
Chp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,It7 attempting to discourage private
actions against corporate mismanagement under section 10(b), reaf-
firmed the battered Birnbaum doctrine.""
Pursuant to a consent decree entered in an antitrust action, the de-
fendant in Blue Chp Stamps, a company that provided trading stamps
to retailers, offered a substantial number of its shares to retailers who
previously used the stamp service but who were not stockholders."19
The retailers charged that the prospectus prepared in connection with
the offer was materially misleading2 ° and that they failed to purchase
stock in reliance on the misleading information.' 2' The Supreme
Court, in a decision based heavily on policy considerations, 22 reaf-
11. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
112. The eminent panel announcing the doctrine consisted of Augustus Hand, author of the
opinion, Learned Hand, and Chief Judge Thomas Swan. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
113. Id
114. 193 F.2d at 464. In Birnbaum the shareholders of a corporation brought a derivative suit
charging the officers and directors of the corporation with violation of their fiduciary duties and
specific acts of fraud. The court concluded that § 10(b) was directed only at fraudulent practices
associated with the sale or purchase of securities and did not encompass fraudulent mismanage-
ment of corporate affairs. Consequently the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue under rule lob-5 because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of the securities in question.
Id
115. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973) (abol-
ished the purchaser-seller requirement altogether); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967) (broker allowed to maintain action against customers who ordered him to purchase
shares, intending to pay only if price increased); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (minority shareholder in a short form merger is a forced
seller); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (extended
Birnbaum requirement to protect parties to an agreement to sell securities).
116. See note 115 supra.
117. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
118. Id
119. Id at 726.
120. Id at 726-27.
121. Id
122. Justice Rehnquist's opinion cited three policy considerations: (I) a susceptibility to "vex-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss4/9
Number 4] INSIDER TRADING IN SECURITIES 931
firmed the purchaser-seller requirement first enunciated in Birnbaum
and denied relief to retailers.I23
The Blue Chp Stamps ruling flatly eliminates the possibility of a
10b-5 action on behalf of the corporation to recover insider trading
profits. Unless the corporation is a defrauded purchaser or seller of
securities, the corporate plaintiff lacks standing to sue under rule lOb-5.
By removing the possibility of a federally derived corporate right of
recovery under rule lOb-5, the Court eliminated a potentially effective
method of regulating insider trading on the open market.124
Until 1976 courts failed to consistently require "scienter" as a requi-
site element of a lOb-5 action.' 25 In 1976, however, the Supreme Court
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 26 resolved this long standing conflict
among the circuits 27 and held: A private cause of action for damages
does not lie under section 10(b) in the absence of an allegation of "sci-
enter." 28 The Court removed any remaining dispute on whether 1Ob-5
liability would lie for negligent conduct alone. 29 The Ernst decision
narrowed the class of culpable defendants to those possessing "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' 30
The third requisite element of a 10b-5 action, a showing of material-
ity, lies at the heart of lOb-5 litigation.' 3 ' A synthesis of the language
employed by various courts yields a definition of materiality that fo-
cuses on whether undisclosed information would affect decisions of the
reasonable investor.'3 2 When the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citi-
atious" litigation possibly leading to threats of large judgments and forcing settlements out of
proportion to the number of suits with merit; (2) a potential for abuse of the discovery system; and
(3) a disproportionate reliance on oral testimony. Id at 739-45.
123. Id at 731. The effect of the Court's ruling on the lower courts' expansion of the pur-
chaser-seller requirement is uncertain. See Note, Standing Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue Chip
Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REv. 428-44 (1976) for a discussion of the effect of Blue Chip Stamps on 1)
the forced-seller doctrine, 2) aborted transactions, and 3) injunctive relief.
124. See notes 219-27 infra and accompanying text.
125. See note 127 infra.
126. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
127. See Comment, The Inadequacy of Rule 10b-5 as a Remedy in Securities Transactions, 4
S.U.L. REv. 234, 236 n.10 (1978) for a list of cases requiring negligence and those requiring scien-
ter prior to Ernst & Ernst.
128. 425 U.S. at 193. In Aaron v. United States, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980), the Court extended this
requisite showing of scienter to lOb-5 injunctive proceedings brought by the SEC.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
131. See note 79 supra.
132. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
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zens v. United States'33 confronted the issue of materiality under lOb-5,
the Court found material those facts that a reasonable investor "might
have considered. . . important"' 34 in making a decision. Five years
later, however, the Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 135
narrowly defined an omitted fact as material "if there is substantial like-
lihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote."' 36 Once again the Supreme Court sharply cur-
tailed available relief under lOb-5 by strictly interpreting the third ele-
ment of a lOb-5 action. Blue Chio Stamps narrowed the class of
compensable plaintiffs, ' Ernst & Ernst narrowed the class of culpable
defendants,'38 and TSC Industries narrowed the definition of material-
ity.
13 9
The lob-5 plaintiff must prove causation of a compensable injury as
the final element in a lOb-5 action. 4 ' Before 1972, a plaintiff satisfied
the causation requirement in a lOb-5 action by showing that plaintiff
detrimentally relied on the alleged material misrepresentation. '4' In
1972,142 however, the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States143 reconstructed the requirement of reliance.
In Affiliated Ute a corporation formed by Ute Indians appointed a
bank as transfer agent for its stock. 44 The bank and its employees
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
133. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
134. Id at 54 (emphasis added).
135. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
136. Id at 449 (emphasis added). Although the TSC case defined materiality in the context of
SEC rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1980), the definition is readily applicable in rule lob-5
cases.
137. See notes 111-23 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
The requisite element of causation stems from the compensatory aspect of rule lob-5 private
actions. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 993 (1976).
141. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
142. Before Affiliated Vte Citizens, List was often cited in support of the need to prove reliance
in rule lOb-5 cases.
143. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
144. 406 U.S. at 144-49. See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REv. 584, 586 n.9 (1975), in which the author states:
The 85 Indian plaintiffs were former shareholders of the Ute Development Corporation.
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purchased shares from the unsophisticated shareholders without dis-
closing the bank's status as a market maker in the stock or the true
value of the shares.' 45 The Court, particularly cognizant of the fiduci-
ary relationship between the bank and the Indian shareholders, held
that positive proof of reliance was not a prerequisite to recovery under
IOb-5 in situations involving primarily a failure to disclose material in-
formation. ' 46 The Court determined that the obligation to disclose ma-
terial facts coupled with the nondisclosure of material facts established
the causation element. 47 The Court's two-prong test for establishing
causation-duty to disclose material information and nondisclosure of
that information-has been labelled a "relaxed causation standard."'' 48
The courts have been inconsistent in their application of the relaxed
causation standard of Affiliated Ute. 149 Their treatment of reliance de-
The corporation had been formed by the Affiliated Ute Citizens, an unincorporated asso-
ciation whose members were of mixed-blood Ute ancestry, under the Ute Partition Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 677-77aa (1970), which provided for partition and distribution of Ute tribal
assets between mixed-blood and full-blood Ute Indians. The Ute Development Corpo-
ration appointed the First Security Bank of Utah as transfer agent for its stock certifi-
cates. Employees of the bank encouraged Indian shareholders to sell their shares to the
bank or to the employees themselves without disclosing that the price in the secondary
market exceeded that paid to the Indian shareholders.
145. 406 U.S. at 144-49.
146. Id. at 153-54. The Court argued that the "defendants may not stand mute while they
facilitate. . . sales to those seeking to profit in the. . . market the defendants had developed and
encouraged and with which they were fully familiar." Id at 153.
147. Id
148. Judge Celebrezze described the rule enunciated in .4ffiliated Ute Citizens as a "relaxed
causation standard." Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
Although some courts speak of the Affiliated Ue holding as creating a presumption of reliance,
the court in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976),
noted that the Supreme Court did not speak of such a presumption. The Blackie court recognized
that "materiality directly establishes causation more likely than not, and that reliance as a separate
requirement is simply a milepost on the road to causation." Id at 906 n.22.
149. Some courts restrict application of Affiliated Ue to similar circumstances. See, e.g., St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 955 (1977).
Other courts extend the "relaxed causation standard" to all nondisclosure or misrepresentation
cases. See, e.g., Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F.
Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio 1974). See generally Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Re-
quirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 363 (1973); Com-
ment, 9 CUM. L. REV. 721 (1979).
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pends on whether the material information was nondisclosed150 or mis-
represented1 5' and whether the transaction occurred face-to-face or on
the open market.' 52 Affiliated Ue concerned the nondisclosure of ma-
terial information in a face-to-face transaction.'5 3 The courts usually
agree that "reliance has little if any rational role" in establishing a pri-
vate action under rule lOb-5 when the alleged deception occurs through
nondisclosure of material facts in a face-to-face transaction.5 4 Hence,
the lower courts almost uniformly adopt a presumption of reliance on a
showing of materiality in nondisclosure cases. 151
The courts refuse to apply Affiliated Ute when the alleged deception
occurs through the misrepresentation of material facts in a face-to-face
transaction; 56  requiring, instead, that plaintiff demonstrate actual
reliance on the misrepresentation. The courts reason that when fraud
occurs through misrepresentation in a face-to-face transaction, the
plaintiff encounters no special difficulties in proving reliance.157
The courts are divided, however, in their treatment of reliance when
150. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Sirota v.
Econo-Car Int'l Inc., 61 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jenkins v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp.
1391, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
151. See, e.g., Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
152. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft, Inc., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973);
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972).
153. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
154. 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, § 8.6, at 209. See note 149 supra.
155. See Note, supra note 144, at 589:
A few courts have held that a reliance requirement still exists, without even mentioning
4ffiliated Ute. One court has said, without further elaboration, that 4ffiliated Ule makes
reliance "a somewhat lesser evidentiary hurdle"; and another appears to have introduced
a new kind of reliance requirement, proof of "general" reliance, which must be met
before Affiliated Ule applies.
Other courts have ameliorated the "relaxed causation standard" by allowing the defendant to
rebut the "presumption of reliance." See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
156. See note 149 supra. Some courts do not require a showing of reliance when both misrep.
resentation and omission are present in the fraudulent activities. See Competitive Assocs., Inc. v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir. 1975); Clark v. Cameron-
Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 57 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
157. See 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, § 8.6, at 209-12 (1975); Note, supra note 144, at 587-
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the alleged fraud is perpetrated on the open market. 5 8 Some courts
abandon the need to demonstrate actual reliance when insider trading
occurs on the open market. 159 They argue that the reliance require-
ment is meaningless when the misrepresentation or nondisclosure oc-
curs in open market trading."6 Deception, if material, presumably
affects the market in the form of inflated or deflated market prices.'
6 1
Therefore, the trading investor, relying on general market conditions
and prices is adversely affected. 162 Proof of specific reliance becomes
superfluous under these circumstances.163 Other courts, however, insist
on maintaining the evidentiary hurdle and require "a direct causal re-
lationship or connection between the insider's trading and the injury
suffered." 164
The effectiveness of rule 1Ob-5 in deterring insider trading on the
open market turns on whether courts will apply the "relaxed causation
standard" in impersonal market transactions. 65 In spite of the strict
purchaser-seller requirement, the necessity of demonstrating scienter,
and the limited definition of materiality, a relaxation of the reliance
requirement in impersonal open market transactions could make rule
lOb-5 a viable remedy for deterring insider trading on the open mar-
ket. 166 Proving reliance on the misrepresented or omitted fact is virtu-
ally impossible when the transaction takes place on the open market. 167
Whether the defrauded open market trader obtains relief thus depends
on the causation standard applied by the court. The Supreme Court
has perpetuated this dilemma by refusing to clarify the role of reliance
in open market transactions. 61 In light of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the scope of rule lOb-5, further expansion of relief under
158. See notes 159-64 infra and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Herbst v. ITT Corp., 495 F.2d 1308 (2d Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Air-
craft Inc., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
160. This is the argument of Professor Bromberg; 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, § 8.6, at 209-
12. See Painter, Inside Information.- Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation
Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLuM. L. REv. 1361, 1370-72 (1965).
161. See Note, supra note 157, at 587-89.
162. Id
163. Id
164. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977).
165. See notes 194-204 infra and accompanying text.
166. Id
167. See note 160 supra.
168. See notes 149-52 supra for cases in which Supreme Court has denied certiorari.
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rule lOb-5 is improbable. 16 9
3. Class Actions
The third form of relief under rule 1Ob-5 is the class action.10 The
class action facilitates claims by small investors whose claims would be
insufficient to warrant individual litigation.'71 Judicial distaste for the
class action, 172 coupled with procedural, evidentiary, and administra-
tive problems, diminishes the potential efficacy of this alternative.
The procedural obstacle erected by the Supreme Court in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin173 illustrates the judicial distaste for class action
suits. The Eisen Court required that individual notice be sent to all
class members whose names and addresses could be ascertained
through reasonable effort. 174 The class action is a desirable vehicle for
litigation because it allows formation of a large class of investors. The
requirement of individual notice, however, renders the class action un-
workable as an effective enforcement alternative.
The evidentiary problems associated with proving actual reliance in
impersonal transactions are compounded in the class action setting. t75
The burden of demonstrating reliance in open market transactions may
be insurmountable. Different degrees of reliance among the plaintiff
169. See note 106 supra.
170. The basic requirements of a class action under Rule 23 are:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Securities fraud cases usually fall under Rule 23(b)(3) which allows a class
action where:
[T]he court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members and the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class ac-
tion is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.
For a thorough discussion of the class action as applied in securities litigation, see Bernfeldt, Class
Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 78 (1969).
171. See 4 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, § 11.6, at 255. See generally W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 16.01, at 483-85 (1978).
172. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissent-
ing), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), described the class action as a "Frankenstein monster."
173. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See Klein, 7he Effect ofEisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin on Corporate
Class Actions, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 57 (1976).
174. 417 U.S. at 173. "The plaintiff in Eisen had a mere $70 at stake and sought to represent a
class of at least 2.25 million members. Personal notice to all of these absentees would have cost
plaintiff approximately $225,000." Klein, supra note 173, at 59.
175. See notes 149-64 supra and accompanying text.
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class may also afford defendant the means with which to challenge
plaintiffs claim.' 76
Administration of relief presents the largest impasse to effective use
of the class action suit. If relief is awarded to every member of the class
based on actual loss incurred, total damages could reach outrageous
proportions. 177 But recovery limited to the insider's profits would re-
move the compensatory incentive for instituting the action.
B. Section 16(b)
The second major provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
governing insider trading is section 16(b). 17  Section 16(b), or the
"short swing profit" provision, imposes strict liability on those falling
within its narrow scope. 179 The section prohibits certain directors,180
officers,'"' and beneficial owners of securities 82 from engaging in the
176. See general), 4 A. BROMBERG, supra note 26, § 11.6, at 255.
177. This is the most frequently cited reason for seeking some limitation to insider liability. In
the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. litigation it was estimated that damages, depending on the method of
calculation used, might well range to $84 million and could possibly reach $390 million-a figure
well over the company's worth. 446 F.2d at 105 n.13.
178. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
Section 16(b) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase,
of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period
of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irre-
spective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in
entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
179. Id Section 16 applies to issuers that have securities registered under § 12 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. Section 12 requires registration of any equity securities listed on a national
exchange and any class of equity securities of an issuer engaged in interstate commerce, or in a
business affecting interstate commerce or whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce if that issuer's total assets exceed $1,000,000 and
the class of equity security is held by 500 or more persons. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
180. A director is "any director of a corporation or any person performing similar functions
with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(7)
(1976).
181. An officer is "a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other
person who performs for an issuer.., functions corresponding to those performed by the forego-
ing officers." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1980).
182. A beneficial owner for purposes of section 16(b) is a "person who is directly or indirectly
the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an
exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title . 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1976).
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purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) of security equities within a
six month period.' 83 Any profit'84 realized from short swing purchases
and sales is recoverable by the corporation or by shareholders of the
corporation in a derivative suit. 18
The guidelines of section 16(b) are clearly delineated and applied in
a fairly mechanical fashion. The primary problem in the application of
section 16(b) concerns the definition of "insider," "sale," "purchase,"
and "profit."'8 6
Although the purpose of section 16(b) is to prevent unfair use of in-
formation obtained by an insider through his relationship with the is-
suer,8 7 the section is both over inclusive and under inclusive in its
reach. Liability is automatically imposed under section 16(b) without a
showing that the insider actually used the confidential information. 88
Conversely, a person who is not a statutorily designated insider, but
trades on the basis of inside information, falls outside the confines of
the section. 8 9 Furthermore, the director, officer, or beneficial owner
who engages in transactions based on inside information but trades
outside the designated six month period escapes the scope of section
16(b). 190
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Existing federal and state remedies are inadequate to curb insider
183. The constitutionality of section 16(b) was upheld in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d
231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
184. The profit realized is computed by matching the highest price sales with the lowest price
purchases during the six month period. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). This method is premised on the theory that "the statute was intended
to . . .squeeze all possible profits out of stock transactions." Id at 239.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
186. See, e.g., Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
188. Thus one of the draftsman of the provision testified before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency:
You hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation to sell the security
within 6 months after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of
such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because
you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended, at the
time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6554 (1934).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
190. For a thorough discussion on the limitations of section 16(b), see 45 NOTRE DAME LAW.
314, 316 n.16 (1969).
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trading on the open securities market. Several alternative means exist
that would more closely regulate insider trading. One alternative is ap-
plication of the Affiliated Ute "relaxed causation standard" when in-
sider trading is perpetuated on the open market.' 9' Another
alternative, suggested in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 92 is a state cause of
action in the corporation to recover insider trading profits. A third al-
ternative provides for a federally derived right of action on behalf of
the corporation to recover insider trading profits.'
93
The first proposal purports to increase the efficacy of private enforce-
ment under rule lOb-5 by removing proof of actual reliance. Although
the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States'94 first
applied the "relaxed causation standard," any further expansion of the
reliance requirement by the Supreme Court is unlikely in view of the
Court's recent restrictions in private actions under lOb-5.195 Unless the
Court decides to limit the Affiliated Ute holding to face-to-face trans-
actions involving the nondisclosure of material information, the indi-
vidual circuits are free to adopt the so-called "relaxed causation
standard."
Uniform application of this standard would foster consistency, sim-
plicity, and predictability. A relaxation of the reliance requirement
would insure the in terrorem effect of section 10(b). 19 6 Nationwide
service of process 197 and a broad choice of venue 9' are additional ad-
vantages offered by this approach.
Relaxation of the reliance requirement would increase the number of
plaintiffs able to bring suit under section 10(b). The large number of
potential plaintiffs would make the class action device more desira-
191. See Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC
Rule lOb-.: .4 Commentary, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 (1977); 1977 UTAH L. REv. 150.
192. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
193. See Ratner, supra note 95, at 960.
194. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
195. See notes 77-177 supra and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun described the Supreme
Court's attitude as a "preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a seeming callous-
ness toward the investing public quite out of keeping ... with our own traditions and the intent
of the securities laws." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
196. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 877 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Moore, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
197. See Ratner, supra note 95.
198. Id.
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ble. t9 9 Relaxation of the reliance requirement would also greatly in-
crease chances for successful application of the class action. The
defendant could no longer assert varying degrees of reliance by the
plaintiffs as an affirmative defense."°°
Because of the increased number of potential plaintiffs, however, and
the availability of the class action, removal of the reliance safeguard
risks inundation of federal courts with groundless rule lOb-5 claims.20 t
Given the present concern with the flood of securities litigation in fed-
eral courts,20 2 the "relaxed causation" alternative presents certain judi-
cial problems.
The greatest infirmity of the "relaxed causation" proposal, however,
is the potential for imposition of unlimited liability on the insider. In
applying a liberal reliance requirement, some courts have adjudged
lOb-5 defendants liable to all investors trading in stock from the time
the insider began trading until effective disclosure.20 3 Other courts
have attempted to mitigate the possibility of unlimited liability by re-
stricting recovery to investors trading on the market during the time the
insider was actually trading.2° Under either approach, potential liabil-
ity could assume punitive proportions. The limitation of the amount of
recovery to the insider's profits, however, reduces individual recovery
to miniscule proportions and decreases the incentive to bring suit.
The second proposal, a state cause of action in the corporation to
recover the insider's profits, was fashioned by the Diamond court
nearly ten years ago.2 5 The Diamond court attempted to bridge the
gap in federal and state regulation of insider trading on the open mar-
ket by creating a cause of action in the corporation.2°  Although the
199. The requirement that individual notice be sent to all class members whose names and
addresses can be ascertained through reasonable effort, however, would hamper effective use of
the class action suit. See notes 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
200. See generally Comment, supra note 149.
201. See note 105 supra.
202. Id
203. This principle concern with unlimited liability led the court in Frdrich v. Bradford to
hold: no private action for damages under rule lob-5 will lie in favor of open market purchasers
or sellers of securities against those persons having material inside information who transact in
those securities without disclosing that information to the marketplace. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
204. Id (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
205. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). See notes 39-65 supra and
accompanying text.
206. Id. at 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
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last decade of Supreme Court activity in the lOb-5 area widened the
gap,2 °7 state courts refuse to adopt the Diamond approach.2 °8
The chief criticism of the Diamond approach is that it lacks uniform-
ity.20 9 Imposition of liability on insiders who trade in stock listed on
the national securities exchange or over-the-counter exchanges will de-
pend on the applicable law of the state of incorporation. 210 Even if the
state recognizes a corporate right of recovery, the plaintiff may not be
able to serve process on all defendants involved in the suit. Although a
shareholder who suspects insider abuse could institute proceedings on
behalf of the corporation, certain states require a derivative complain-
ant to post security for expenses incurred by the defense.2 ' These pro-
cedural obstacles hamper effective corporate recovery at the state level.
Additionally, the Diamond approach raises the possibility of dual lia-
bility under concurrent federal and state law.2" 2 The defendant could
interplead all possible claimants to avoid double liability.2" 3 This sug-
gestion, however, presents several problems. First, effective use of state
interpleader is hindered by difficulties in obtaining jurisdiction over all
traders. 21 4 Secondly, the addition of a section 16(b), section 10(b), or
rule 1Ob-5 claim divests the state court of jurisdiction because federal
courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all claims brought under the
1934 Act.21 5
In an effort to ameliorate the effect of dual liability, courts have or-
dered defendants to place insider trading profits in escrow.2 6 After
five years, any unclaimed moneys in the account are paid to the corpo-
ration.217 This alternative, however, ignores the separate harm to the
corporation 218 and places the costs of administering the fund on the
207. See notes 77-139 supra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., 83 HARV. L. REv. 1421 (1970).
210. See note 95 supra.
211. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1965).
212. See, e.g., Note, Common Law Corporate Recoveryfor Trading on Non-Public Information,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 289-294 (1974).
213. See note 63 supra.
214. See note 212 supra.
215. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
216. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a id, 446 F.2d
1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
217. Id
218. The theoretical solution to the problem of concurrent liability is to recognize two injuries:
not only on the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty, but also on the trading investors for
violation of federal securities law. Under this approach, however, actual injury to the corporation
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corporation. If all the money is claimed before expiration of five years,
the corporation is financially penalized for bringing the suit.
The third and most feasible proposal is a federally derived cause of
action in the corporation to recover the insider's profits.219 This propo-
sal retains many of the positive attributes of the "relaxed causation"
alternative and eliminates the potential imposition of unlimited liabil-
ity.22° Nationwide service of process and wide selection of venue are
available under a federally derived right of recovery in the corpora-
tion.221  Additionally, a federally derived cause of action retains the
virtues of consistency, simplicity, and predictability.
Contrary to the "relaxed causation" proposal, the theory behind the
proposal for a federal cause of action in the corporation is not compen-
sation of injured open market traders.222 The proposal, like the Dia-
mond approach, seeks to deter insider trading by placing the right of
recovery in a readily available plaintiff, the corporation.2 3 By placing
the right of recovery in the corporation or derivatively, its stockholders,
uninterested shareholders are replaced with corporate watchdogs. A
shareholder who suspects insider abuse could institute proceedings on
behalf of the corporation. By limiting the amount of damages to in-
sider profits, the danger of unlimited liability is ameliorated. Sanctions
are thus imposed on insiders to discourage an undesirable practice, not
to compensate injured victims of open market transactions.2 4
The proposal's sanction would extend beyond the arbitrary six
month period established in section 16(b).22  Additionally, the propo-
sal would ease the harshness of section 16(b)'s strict liability by requir-
ing proof of actual insider abuse.
Before Blue Chip Stamps, gradual erosion of the Birnbaum doctrine
revealed the possibility that courts could implant a federal cause of ac-
tion in the corporation.226 Affirmation of the purchaser-seller require-
would not necessarily be commensurate with the insider's profit. Although loss ofcorporate good-
will and harm to corporate reputation constitute injury to the corporation, proof of these injuries
would be very difficult.
219. See note 95 supra.
220. See notes 196-204 supra and accompanying text.
221. See notes 197-98 supra and accompanying text.
222. See Ratner, supra note 95, at 956.
223. d
224. Id
225. See notes 178-90 supra and accompanying text.
226. See notes 111-24 supra and accompanying text.
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ment in section 10(b) actions, however, extinguished judicial
implementation of this approach.227 A federally derived right of recov-
ery in the corporation or, derivatively, its shareholders, will thus re-
quire congressional action.
The proposal for a federal derivative cause of action is not free from
infirmities. First, additional federal relief would accelerate the growth
of securities litigation in federal courts.228 Secondly, federal legislation
creating a corporate right of recovery could signal encroachment of
federal law into issues of corporate mismanagement and fiduciary du-
ties of corporate officers, areas traditionally of state concern. Lastly,
adoption of a federal cause of action in the corporation would place the
defendant in jeopardy of multiple liability under section 16(b), section
10(b), and the proposed federal right of corporate recovery.
CONCLUSION
In spite of difficulties mentioned in connection with the federally de-
rived cause of action, the absence of effective regulation of insider trad-
ing on the open securities market demands legislative implementation
of this approach. The Supreme Court decisions in 10(b) actions have
effectively diminished opportunities for judicial resolution at the fed-
eral level.22 9 State courts have similarly failed to respond with effective
relief in an area that is arguably of traditional state concern.230 Federal
securities laws purport to "insure the maintenance of a fair and honest
market," but in actuality leave a major area of insider trading unregu-
lated. The burden is thus on Congress to effectuate this goal.
Anne Graff Brown
227. Id
228. See note 105 supra.
229. See notes 77-139 supra and accompanying text.
230. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text.
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